Philosophy and climate change /
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Philosophy and climate change /

This volume illustrates the diverse ways that philosophy can contribute to conversations around climate change, and explores the ways in which thinking about climate change can help to illuminate a range of topics of independent interest to philosophers.

Bibliographic Details
Corporate Author: Oxford Scholarship Online
Other Authors: Budolfson, Mark (Editor), McPherson, Tristram Colin, 1975- (Editor), Plunkett, David (Editor)
Format: Online Book
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2021.
Edition:First edition.
Series:Engaging philosophy.
Subjects:
Climatic changes > Philosophy.
Climatic changes > Social aspects.
Electronic books.
Access:Online version
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Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Philosophy and Climate Change
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • List of Contributors
  • Abstracts of Chapters
  • Section I. Valuing Climate Change Impacts
  • 1 A Convenient Truth? Climate Change and Quality of Life
  • 2 Animals and Climate Change
  • 3 Discounting under Risk: Utilitarianism vs. Prioritarianism
  • 4 A Philosopher's Guide to Discounting
  • 5 Does Climate Change Policy Depend Importantly on Population Ethics? Deflationary Responses to the Challenges of Population Ethics for Public Policy
  • Section II. Cognition, Emotions, and Climate Change
  • 7 The Wages of Fear? Toward Fearing Well About Climate Change
  • 8 Climate Change and Cultural Cognition
  • Section III. Climate Change and Individual Ethics
  • 9 Climate Change and Individual Obligations: A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach, and the Need for an Imperfect View
  • 10 The Puzzle of Inefficacy
  • 11 On Individual and Shared Obligations: In Defense of the Activist's Perspective
  • 12 How Much Harm Does Each of Us Do?
  • Section IV. Climate Change and Politics
  • 13 How Quickly Should the World Reduce its Greenhouse Gas Emissions? Climate Change and the Structure of Intergenerational Justice
  • 14 Political Realism, Feasibility Wedges, and Opportunities for Collective Action on Climate Change
  • 15 Pareto Improvements and Feasible Climate Solutions
  • 16 Climate Change, Liberalism, and the Public/Private Distinction
  • Introduction
  • Section I: Valuing Climate Change Impacts
  • Chapter 1: A Convenient Truth?: Climate Change and Quality of Life
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Nature and Measure of Subjective Well-Being
  • 3. Subjective Well-Beingand Its Correlates
  • 4. Affect as Information and Guidance
  • 5. Affect and Subjective Well-Being
  • 6. A Recent Critique
  • 7. Subjective Well-Beingand Climate
  • References.
  • Chapter 2: Animals and Climate Change
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Farmed Animals, Climate Change, and a Duty to Resist
  • 3. Wild Animals, Climate Change, and a Duty to Assist
  • 4. Animals, Climate Change, and a Life Worth Living
  • 5. Animals, Climate Change, and a Life Worth Creating
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 3: Discounting under Risk: Utilitarianism vs. Prioritarianism
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Choice of the Social Welfare Framework: Utilitarianism vs. Prioritarianism
  • 2.1 Risk and Equity: Aggregation Issues
  • 2.2 Social Welfare Function
  • 3. Implications for Discounting
  • 3.1 Preliminaries
  • 3.2 Utilitarianism and the Ramsey Rule
  • 3.3 Utilitarian Discounting and the Precautionary Effect
  • 3.4 Discounting under Alternative Welfare Frameworks
  • 4. Conclusions
  • References
  • Chapter 4: A Philosopher's Guide to Discounting
  • 1. Introducing and Defending the Ramsey Rule
  • 2. Why the Terms of Measurement Matter
  • 3. Descriptivism and Prescriptivism in Discounting Methodology
  • 4. The Role of Moral Experts in Parameter Assignments
  • 5. Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 5: Does Climate Change Policy Depend Importantly on Population Ethics?: Deflationary Responses to the Challenges of Population Ethics for Public Policy
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Population Axiology and the Repugnant Conclusion
  • 3. First Deflationary Response: Axiologies May Agree about Climate Change
  • 4. Second Deflationary Response: Bounded Population Principles
  • 4.1 Axiology with Population Size Bounds
  • 4.2 Possibility Proof for Escaping the Repugnant Conclusion while Satisfying Bounded Versions of Population Ethics Desiderata
  • 5. Conclusion
  • Appendix: A Smoothness Axiom and a New Argument for Total Utilitarianism
  • References
  • Section II: Cognition, Emotions, and Climate Change
  • Chapter 6: Way to Go, Me
  • 1. Introduction.
  • 2. Climate Change as a Creeping Environmental Problem
  • 3. Different Orientations
  • 4. Switching Between Orientations and Mindset M
  • 5. Seeking Self-Praiseversus Avoiding Self-Blame
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 7: The Wages of Fear?: Toward Fearing Well About Climate Change
  • 1. The Promise of Fear
  • 2. The Wages of Fear
  • 3. The Possibility of Hope
  • 4. The Perils of Hope
  • 5. Civic Fear
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 8: Climate Change and Cultural Cognition
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Cultural Cognition
  • 3. Values or Beliefs?
  • 4. Cultural Cognition and Coincidence
  • 5. Geoengineering
  • 6. Conclusion
  • References
  • Section III: Climate Change and Individual Ethics
  • Chapter 9: Climate Change and Individual Obligations: A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach, and the Need for an Imperfect View
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach
  • 3. Diagnosis
  • 4. The Imperfect Approach
  • 5. Extension to Other Cases
  • References
  • Chapter 10: The Puzzle of Inefficacy
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Introducing the Puzzle of Inefficacy
  • 3. Ethical Structure and Social Structure
  • 4. Contribution Ethics: A Sketch
  • 5. Negligibility and Interaction
  • 6. Conclusions
  • References
  • Chapter 11: On Individual and Shared Obligations: In Defense of the Activist's Perspective
  • 1. The Activist's Perspective
  • 2. Two Problems of Individual Incapability and Group Agency
  • 3. Obligations
  • 4. Irreducibly Shared Obligations
  • 5. Collective Obligations in Spite of Individual Incapability
  • 6. Remaining Problems of Collective Capability and Individual Incapability
  • References
  • Chapter 12: How Much Harm Does Each of Us Do?
  • 1. Sorts of Harm and Their Quantity
  • 2. New Data and Estimates
  • 3. Lives for Money
  • 4. The Consequences of Discounting
  • 5. Conclusion and Why It Matters.
  • 7. Feasibility Wedges and a Meta-Architecture for Global Agreement
  • References
  • Chapter 15: Pareto Improvements and Feasible Climate Solutions
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Concept of 'Political Feasibility'
  • 2.1 A Working Definition of 'Political Feasibility'
  • 2.2 Feasibility and Self-Interest
  • 3. International Paretianism and Climate Change
  • 3.1 Prospects for IP Climate Treaties
  • 3.1.1 Climate Change as a Coordination Game
  • 3.1.2 Climate Change as a Prisoners' Dilemma
  • 3.2 Does 'Self-Interest'Suffice?
  • 4. The Feasibility of IP Climate Deals
  • References
  • Chapter 16: Climate Change, Liberalism, and the Public/Private Distinction
  • 1. Climate Change and the Anthropocene
  • 2. Liberalism and the Public/Private Distinction
  • 3. The Distinction Under Pressure
  • 4. Pressure Drop?
  • 5. Concluding Remarks
  • References
  • Index.

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